Benutzer:Bocardodarapti/Arbeitsseite/Cogni/Papers

Leonid Berov und Kai-Uwe Kühnberger

An Evaluation of Perceived Personality in Fictional Characters Generated by Affective Simulation

Proceedings of the Ninth International Conference on Computational Creativity, Salamanca, Spain: Association for Computational Creativity. (2018)

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326266123_An_Evaluation_of_Perceived_Personality_in_Fictional_Characters_Generated_by_Affective_Simulation

„Central to the affective reasoning components is personality. It is defined for each agent as a point in a five-dimensional space ${}[-1,1]^{5}$, with the axes corresponding to the Big Five personality traits. Based on its personality, the agents default mood can be computed according to a formula derived by Mehrabian (1996, see their table 4). Here, mood (i.e. medium-term affect) is represented as a point in a three-dimensional space ${}[-1,1]^{3}$, with the axes Pleasure, Arousal and Dominance (PAD).“

Julius Schöning, Thea Behrens, Patrick Faion, Peyman Kheiri, Gunther Heidemann und Ulf Krumnack

Structure from Motion by Artificial Neural Networks

Scandinavian Conference on Image Analysis (SCIA), pages: 146-158, 2017.

https://www.ikw.uni-osnabrueck.de/fileadmin/user_upload/computer_vision/publications/scia17.pdf

„Nowadays, image-based ${}3D$ reconstruction, also known as multiview stereo approaches, are usually realized as an analytic solution, based on multiple view geometry. In general, almost all approaches use the principle of Structure from Motion (SfM)—or rephrased real wold object shapes from different ${}2D$ images captured from different locations. The reconstructed ${}3D$ objects are usually represented by a set of ${}s$ points in a ${}3D$ space calculated from ${}w\geq 2$ 2D images captured from different camera positions. This kind of representation leads to a non linear least squares problem with ${}2\cdot w\cdot s$ constraints and ${}6\cdot w+3\cdot s$ unknowns.“

Sven Walter

Zombies, Dualismus und Physikalismus

Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, Bd. 65, H. 2 (2011), pp. 241-254

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/41346224.pdf

„(${}P_{1}$) Zombies sind vorstellbar.

(${}P_{2}$) Wenn Zombies vorstellbar sind, dann sind Zombies möglich.

(${}P_{3}$) Wenn Zombies möglich sind, dann ist der Physikalismus falsch.

Also: Der Physikalismus ist falsch.“

(S. 245)

(siehe auch S. 247 für eine modallogische Argumentation)