Projekt:Einführung Marktdesign/Lesematerial

• Game Theory in the tradition of Bob Wilson - Paper Collections

Procurement Auction

Scoring Auction

• Design competition through multidimensional auctions YK Che - rand Journal of Economics, 1993

If the buyer can commit to a scoring rule in his best interest. The resulting optimal scoring rule under rewards quality relative to the buyer's utility function and implements the optimal outcome for the buyer in the first- and second-score auctions. Absent the commitment power, the only feasible scoring rule is the buyer's utility function, in which all three schemes yield the same expected utility to the buyer, and first- and second-score auctions induce the first-best level of quality, which out to be excessive from the buyer's point of view.

• Bidder cost revelation in electric power auctions JB Bushnell, SS Oren - Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1994 - Springer

• Configurable offers and winner determination in multi-attribute auctions M Bichler, J Kalagnanam - European Journal of Operational Research, 2005

• Models for iterative multiattribute procurement auctions DC Parkes, J Kalagnanam - Management Science, 2005

• Equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders: the two-bidder case H Fang, SO Parreiras - Games and Economic Behavior, 2002

• Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty MÁ de Frutos, L Pechlivanos - Games and Economic Behavior, 2006

• Properties of scoring auctionsJ Asker, E Cantillon - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2008

Menu Auction

• Menu auctions, resource allocation, and economic influenceBD Bernheim, MD Whinston

In many examples of competitive bidding (e.g., government construction contracting) the relevant object is either partially divisible or ill-defined, in contrast to much of the recent theoretical work on auctions. In this paper we consider a more general class of auctions, in which bidders name a “menu” of offers for various possible actions (allocations) available to the auctioneer. We focus upon “first-price” menu auctions under the assumption of complete information, and show that, for an attractive refinement of the set of Nash Equilibria, an efficient action always results. Our model also has application to situations of economic influence, in which interested parties independently attempt to influence a decision-maker's action.