Projekt:Einführung Marktdesign/Seminare
Workshops
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| The Behavioral and Experimental Economics Workshop |
Auction Theory
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| Paul Milgrom "Auctions and Matching: the New Science of Market Design" at FCC | Auctions and Matching: the New Science of Market Design
Paul Milgrom, Stanford University September 9, 2003 In this 88 minute lecture, Professor Milgrom looks at several recent successful auction designs. These include the FCC simultaneous multiple-round auction which allocates spectrum, the National Resident Matching Program which matches doctors to hospital residency programs, and the EDF auction of power generation capacity. He also discusses recent academic research in market design, including empirical, theoretical, and experimental work. Moreover, Professor Milgrom also discusses a number of important insights arising out of that academic work. These include, for example, information on why muti-round auctions may be needed to find stable allocations, how product complementarity can lead to seller market power in exchanges, and why proxy bidding can eliminate collusion and speed the market-clearing process. Professor Milgrom holds an MS in statistics and PhD in business from Stanford University, where he now teaches in the Department of Economics. This lecture is part of the FCCs Excellence in Economics Program which is intended to train FCC staff members. | ||
| Introduction to Auction Market Theory by Bill Duryea | |||
| Simple Auctions with Near-Optimal Equilibria - Tim Roughgarden | Innovations in Algorithmic Game Theory
May 26th, 2011 Hebrew University of Jerusalem Second session: Tim Roughgarden - Simple Auctions with Near-Optimal Equilibria. Session Chair: Michal Feldman |
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| Revenue Maximization in Probabilistic Single-Item Auctions via Signaling - Michal Feldman | Innovations in Algorithmic Game Theory
May 25th, 2011 Hebrew University of Jerusalem First session: Michal Feldman - Revenue Maximization in Probabilistic Single-Item Auctions via Signaling Session Chair: Amos Fiat |
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| Single Valued Combinatorial Auctions with Budgets - Stefano Leonardi | Innovations in Algorithmic Game Theory
May 26th, 2011 Hebrew University of Jerusalem First session: Stefano Leonardi - Single Valued Combinatorial Auctions with Budgets. Session Chair: Anna Karlin |
292 views | |
| Dominant-Strategy Auction Design for Agents with Uncertain, Private Values - Kevin Leyton-Brown | Innovations in Algorithmic Game Theory
May 25th, 2011 Hebrew University of Jerusalem First session: Kevin Leyton-Brown - Dominant-Strategy Auction Design for Agents with Uncertain, Private Values Session Chair: Amos Fiat |
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| Peaches, Lemons, and Cookies: Designing Auction Markets with Dispersed Information - Moshe Babaioff | Innovations in Algorithmic Game Theory
May 25th, 2011 Hebrew University of Jerusalem First session: Moshe Babaioff - Peaches, Lemons, and Cookies: Designing Auction Markets with Dispersed Information Session Chair: Amos Fiat |
107 views | |
| Crowdsourced Bayesian Auctions - Jing Chen | Innovations in Algorithmic Game Theory
May 25th, 2011 Hebrew University of Jerusalem First session: Jing Chen - Crowdsourced Bayesian Auctions. Session Chair: Amos Fiat |
116 views | |
| Mechanism Design with Information Acquisition: Efficiency and Full Surplus Extraction | Innovations in Algorithmic Game Theory
May 25th, 2011 Hebrew University of Jerusalem First session: Sushil Bikhchandani - Mechanism Design with Information Acquisition: Efficiency and Full Surplus Extraction. Session Chair: Amos Fiat |
158 views | |
| Automated Market-Making via Online Convex Optimization - Yiling Chen | Innovations in Algorithmic Game Theory
May 24th, 2011 Hebrew University of Jerusalem Second session: Yiling Chen - Automated Market-Making via Online Convex Optimization Session Chair: Kevin Leyton-Brown |
322 views | |
| Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price... | ABSTRACT
We investigate the "generalized second price" auction (GSP), a new mechanism which is used by search engines to sell online advertising that most Internet users encounter daily. GSP is tailored to its unique environment, and neither the mechanism nor the environment have previously been... |
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| Collusive Dominant-Strategy Truthfulness - Silvio Micali | Innovations in Algorithmic Game Theory
May 26th, 2011 Hebrew University of Jerusalem First session: Silvio Micali - Collusive Dominant-Strategy Truthfulness. Session Chair: Anna Karlin |
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| Auction Market Theory - Volume Profile - Rob Mitchell | 389 views |