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The central argument of this article is that it is possible to identify one major or primary potential that sortition brings to the political community when it is used to select office holders. This is to be found when sortition is used in such a way as to maximise its most essential feature – its arationality – and where such an application has the most significant and positive impact on the political process and the political community. In such applications the advantages of using an arational process can be seen as outweighing its disadvantages. In political practice – especially in a republican context – this primary political potential is the ability of sortition to protect the public process of selection from subversion by those who might wish to use it for their own private or partisan ends. This helps to defend the polity from those seeking to exercise unconstitutional or arbitrary power – either in the form of a single tyrant or of factions vying for partisan control. In addition, sortition can produce a series of secondary benefits to the republican polity: the polity can be understood as impartial, the threshold to citizen participation can be lowered and the model of the independent citizen encouraged. These benefits, however, can be seen as deriving from initial protection of the process of selection from manipulation – a quality of lot which is present whatever the motivation of those instigating a particular lottery scheme. Although the political use of lot cannot be confined to the protection of open government, its potential to limit the power of individuals or covert groupings makes it naturally commensurate with this role.

  • Let's Toss for It: A Surprising Curb on Political Greed, by Sigmund Knag, Independent Review, Vol. 3 No. 2, Autumn 1998
  • Defense of the Constitutions of the United States, Vol. I, Letter XIX: Venice, by John Adams, 1787. History of the Republic of Venice and their use of sortition in a constitutional frame
  • How to Pick Our Leaders: Should We Try a Lottery?, by Dick Dougherty, The Independent Institute, January 7, 1999.
  • Solon and Sortition, article on "Archon", The Encyclopedia Britannica, Eleventh Ed., Vol. II, 1910.
  • The Athenian Constitution: Government by Jury and Referendum, by Roderick T. Long, Autumn 1996, published by the Libertarian Nation Foundation.
  • Choosing Representatives by Lottery Votin, Akhil Reed Amar, 93 Yale L.J. 1283, June, 1984.
  • Lottery Voting: A Thought Experiment, Akhil Reed Amar (Yale Law school, 1-1-1995) — Proposes election by random drawing of ballots cast in a district.
  • Demarchy: A democratic alternative to electoral politics, by Brian Martin, bmartin@uow.edu.au, August 1989; revised January 2001.
  • Democracy without Elections, by Brian Martin, Social Anarchism 21 (1995-1996).
  • An Essay on Democracy, by Peter Landry, peteblu@blupete.com, May, 1997. Re-edit:April, 1999.
  • Going Bezirke, review in Reason by John McClaughry of A Solving Problems Without Large Government: Devolution, Fairness, and Equality, by George W. Liebmann, Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2000.
  • What could the social structure of anarchy look like?.
  • Transformational Politics, by Tom Atlee, 1991, revised Sept. 1999.
  • A Citizen Legislature, by Ernest Callenbach and Michael Phillips, In Context 11 (Autumn 1985).
  • A Citizen Legislature, by Ernest Callenbach and Michael Phillips, Berkeley, California: Banyan Tree Books, 1985.
  • A Model for a Tiered Constituent Assembly, Proposed Models for a Canadian Constituent Assembly, by Bill Longstaff (1997).
  • Citizens' Juries in Great Britain, by Jen Romslo and Sascha Pohl. Report of the British experience with citizens' juries.
  • Toward Deliberative Institutions: Lesson from Citizens' Juries, by Graham Smith and Corinne Wales.
  • Citizens´ Constitution of Czech Republic (Draft No 1, 2002) — Proposes "citizens commissions" selected by sortition as a key governing component.
  • Sortition for Judges, by Jon Roland.
  • Laws, Plato (~348 BCE) — Model laws for a republic, including sortition for judges and other officials.
  • Judging Athenian Dramatic Competitions — Analysis of ancient Athenian practices for selecting winners.
  • Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, Book 6, Chap. 10, by William Godwin. Not favorable to sortition, but not fond of balloting, either.
  • Reflections on the Revolution in France, by Edmund Burke, 1790. Argues against sortition, for representation based on merit and property.

About the Kleroterians

Equality-by-lot is the blog of the Kleroterians. The Kleroterians are an informal group interested in the deliberate use of randomness (lottery) in human affairs. There are two main areas of interest: Its use in Governance (sortition) and Distribution. The aim of this blog is to provide a discussion and information forum for ourselves, but also a ‘shop-window’ for our ideas.

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