|Sortition as a sustainable protection against oligarchy, english subtitle||
|Die Auslosung als politisch dauerhafte Lösung gegen die Oligarchie, German subtitle||
|Douglas North - Effect of Institutions on Market Performance at FCC||Effect of Institutions on Market Performance
Douglas North, Nobel Laureate, Washington University
June 30, 2003
In this 70 minute lecture, Dr. North talks about institutions and economic development. He focuses on two issues. One is what prevents economies from working well and the other is what can we do about it. He begins with Neoclassical economics, the theory we use to understand the problems. He observes that its objective was to explain efficient resource allocation in developed economies and, thus, was never intended to deal with the issues of economic development. He argues that, when we try to Neoclassical theory to development issues, we find that it has two serious problems: first, it mistakenly assumes the economy is frictionless and, second, it incorrectly assumes the economy is timeless (i.e., static rather than dynamic).
Dr. North then talks about how government should deal with those two problems. He notes that Neo-classical economists have gone into countries and said that all you have to do is get the prices right and everything works, but they have fallen flat on their faces over and over again. What is needed, he says, is to know enough about the background and cultural heritage of a society so you have some feeling for the interplay between the formal rules and the informal norms and the way they work. That is, we must understand the countrys institutions which are the incentive systems that structure human interaction and reduce uncertainty. What is also needed, he explains, is to have a sense of the margins where changes will be effective and what the implications of those changes will be.
Dr. North received the Nobel Prize in 1993 for his research on the economic history of the U.S. and Europe, as well as for his contributions to understanding how economic and political institutions change over time. He is a professor in the Department of Economics at Washington University in St. Louis and holds a PhD from the University of California, Berkeley. This lecture is the first in the Chief Economists Distinguished Speaker Series at the FCC. That series is part of the FCCs Excellence in Economics Program which is intended to train FCC staff members.
|Challenging Institutional Analysis and Development: The Bloomington School||The Mercatus Center at George Mason University hosted a special installment of the Mercatus Lecture Series with 2009 Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom along with Peter Boettke and Paul Dragos Aligica discussing Dr. Ostrom's work with the Bloomington School and Dr. Boettke and Dr. Aligica's book on the subject.||525 views|
|Lessons of New Institutional Economics for Development||Are we all institutionalists now? What should development agencies really learn from the New Institutional Economics? Nye discusses the impediments to growth in underdeveloped countries and explains why most reform attempts ignore the most important distortions in poorly functioning economies and misunderstand the incentives facing both donors and recipients.||2530 views|
|Public Choice Theory and its Relevance to Public Administrat||Public Choice Theory and its Relevance to Public Administration||7767 views|
|Public Choice Economics with Ivan Pongracic|
|Public Choice||Public Choice by Isaac Morehouse||40 views|
|Timur Kuran: Institutions and Economic Performance||In this educational video, Duke Professor Timur Kuran speaks with Nobel Laureate Douglass North.
"Institutions and Economic Performance: A Conversation between Douglass North and Timur Kuran" (41 minute educational video for the Idea Channel, May 2000).
|The Natural State||Speaker: Prof Douglass C. North, Nobel Economics Laureate 1993
Neither economics nor political science can explain the process of modern social development. The fact that developed societies always have developed economies and developed polities suggests that the connection between economics and politics must be a fundamental part of the development process. Prof North presents an integrated theory of economics and politics. He described how,beginning 10,000 years ago, limited access social orders developed that were able to control violence, provide order, and allow greater production through specialization and exchange. Limited access orders provide order by using the political system to limit economic entry to create rents, and then using the rents to stabilize the political system and limit violence. This type of political economy arrangement is called a natural state. It appears to be the natural way that human societies are organized, even in most of the contemporary world. In contrast, a handful of developed societies have developed open access social orders. In these societies, open access and entry into economic and political organizations sustains economic and political competition. Social order is sustained by competition rather than rent-creation. The key to understanding modern social development is understanding the transition from limited to open access social orders, which only a handful of countries have managed since WWII.
|Social Change-1||295 views|
|Social Norms Institutions and Economic Growth-2||Social Norms Institutions and Economic Growth-2||463 views|
|Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems||Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems||3562 views|
|Ecosystems and Socioeconomic Systems as Complex Adaptive Systems||Simon A. Levin, George M. Moffett Professor of Biology and director of the Center for BioComplexity at Princeton University, delivers the second of his two 2008 Pardee Distinguished Lectures on how we can apply the natural world's lessons in sustainability to our own increasingly unstable world.
Hosted by Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future on October 29, 2008.